What You Sign Is Not What You Run: The Verifiability Gap in Quantized LLM Supply Chains

cs.CR cs.LG Wei-Liang Liu, Cheng-Yen Tsai · Oct 14, 2026
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What it does
Model signing authenticates the full-precision weights W an LLM is released with, yet users run a quantized artifact Q whose producing transformation is not uniquely determined under current disclosure. We separate the non-environment...
Why it matters
As a security characterization, benign floating-point non-determinism separates from uniformly placed nibble-flip tampering above a detection floor that grows with the environments a verifier must allow, but a targeted embedding edit...
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Abstract

Model signing authenticates the full-precision weights W an LLM is released with, yet users run a quantized artifact Q whose producing transformation is not uniquely determined under current disclosure. We separate the non-environment inputs from the execution environment E and measure a quantity that, to our knowledge, has not been measured before: the Independent Verifiability Rate (IVR), the fraction of a popularity-sampled GGUF ecosystem that a third party can re-derive bit-for-bit. Across the 200 most-downloaded Hugging Face GGUF repositories (198 in scope), no artifact or model card records the build environment, so under a recorded-inputs protocol the IVR is 0/198. Yet the artifacts are not irreproducible. On four in-sample repositories that disclose their inputs, the card's information alone reproduces no Q4_K_M file, but two coordinates the card omits - the build's floating-point-contraction setting and, for hybrid models, the per-tensor quantization recipe - re-derive 7/8 target-quant files bit-for-bit on x86 (5/8 on arm64); the fp16 re-derives from the provider's checkpoint, but the calibration imatrix must be shipped and hash-bound, since recomputing it did not match. An older release additionally pins the instruction set and did not re-derive. Reproducing the divergence reported with llama.cpp PR #25353, we show that E is a necessary coordinate and that one compiler setting yields a unique output across the tested platforms at negligible quality cost (+0.06% perplexity). As a security characterization, benign floating-point non-determinism separates from uniformly placed nibble-flip tampering above a detection floor that grows with the environments a verifier must allow, but a targeted embedding edit evades the statistic, so the proposed protocol rests on exact re-derivation; adversarial-fp16 attacks lie outside it. We release the audit data and a re-runnable harness.

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